



Organisme pour la sécurité  
De l'aviation civile

**F A X U R G E N T**

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**Département Gestionnaire de la Sécurité**

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Emetteur (From): Fax: **33 01 46 42 65 39**  
N°: 06/21/SB/OSAC/DMGS

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Date : 01 mars 2021

**Destinataire(s) (To): Pour les personnes concernées (To whom it may concern)**

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**OBJET : Avis d'émission de l'AD urgente de l'EASA de référence CF 2021-05 R1**  
*(TC EAD CF-2021-05 R1 issuing notice)*

**BELL TEXTRON CANADA LTD (BTCL)**

**Bell 505 helicopters**

**Rotors Flight Control – Collective Controls – Failure of Pilot Collective Stick and Grip Assembly**

**Le présent fax signale l'émission de la Directive de Navigabilité EASA citée en objet dont le texte est joint.**

*This fax reports the issuing of the subject EASA AD which is enclosed.*

**Cette AD est, réglementairement, directement applicable sur les aéronefs inscrits au registre français.**

*According to the rules, this AD is directly applicable to the French registered affected aircraft.*

**This AD revises TCCA AD CF-2021-05 dated 21 February 2021.**  
*Cette CN révisé l'AD CF-2021-05 du TCCA du 21 février 2021.*



# **EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE**

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*This Airworthiness Directive (AD) is issued pursuant to Canadian Aviation Regulation (CAR) 521.427. No person shall conduct a take-off or permit a take-off to be conducted in an aircraft that is in their legal custody and control, unless the requirements of CAR 605.84 pertaining to ADs are met. Standard 625 - Aircraft Equipment and Maintenance Standards Appendix H provides information concerning alternative means of compliance (AMOC) with ADs.*

**Number:**

CF-2021-05R1

**Effective Date:**

26 February 2021

**ATA:**

67

**Type Certificate:**

H-112

**Subject:**

Rotors Flight Control – Collective Controls – Failure of Pilot Collective Stick and Grip Assembly

**Revision:**

Supersedes AD CF-2021-05, issued 21 February 2021.

**Applicability:**

Bell Textron Canada Limited (Bell) model 505 helicopters, serial numbers 65011 and subsequent.

**Compliance:**

As indicated below, unless already accomplished.

**Background:**

Bell has received a report where a pilot collective stick and grip assembly (hereafter called pilot collective stick) fractured above the cabin floor at the junction with the collective jackshaft. This finding occurred prior to engine start during the pilot pre-flight check of flight controls for travel. Examination of the fractured pilot collective stick and another cracked pilot collective stick by Bell revealed fatigue cracking.

Based on Bell's findings, it was determined that the one-time visual inspection introduced in Bell Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 505-21-20 and mandated by AD CF-2021-05 is not adequate. As a result, Bell published ASB 505-21-20, Revision A to require a repetitive fluorescent penetrant inspection (FPI) that is capable of detecting smaller cracks. The ASB also includes the requirement to repeat the FPI at intervals of 25 hours air time.

Since cracking may lead to failure of the pilot collective stick and consequent loss of control of the helicopter, Transport Canada (TC) issues AD revision CF-2021-05R1 to mandate the inspection of the pilot collective stick in accordance with ASB 505-21-20, Revision A. As the collection and analysis of inspection findings are still ongoing, this AD is considered an interim action. TC may mandate further corrective actions.

**Corrective Actions:**

**Part I – Initial Inspection**

- A. Before further flight, carry out an initial FPI of the pilot collective stick to detect cracking, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Bell ASB 505-21-20, Revision A, dated 26 February 2021. A FPI carried out in accordance with the original issue of Bell ASB 505-21-20 is acceptable for compliance with this Corrective Action.
- B. If the pilot collective stick is found to be unserviceable, replace the pilot collective stick with a serviceable part before further flight. For the purpose of this AD, a serviceable pilot collective stick is a new pilot collective stick or a pilot collective stick with no crack found during the FPI of Part I

Corrective Action A. above.

**Part II – Repetitive Inspection**

- A. Repeat the FPI of Part I, Corrective Action A. above at intervals not exceeding 25 hours air time since the last FPI.
- B. If the pilot collective stick is found to be unserviceable, replace the pilot collective stick with a serviceable part before further flight.

**Part III – Ferry Flight Provision**

Operators of helicopters equipped with dual flight controls are permitted to carry out ferry flights required to bring the helicopter to a maintenance base to carry out the FPI, provided that the helicopter is flown from the copilot seat only.

Later revisions of Bell ASB 505-21-20 approved by the Chief, Continuing Airworthiness, Transport Canada, are acceptable for compliance with the requirements of this AD.

**Authorization:**

For the Minister of Transport,

*ORIGINAL SIGNED BY*

Rémy Knoerr  
Chief, Continuing Airworthiness  
Issued on 26 February 2021

**C. Contact:**

Philip Tang, Continuing Airworthiness, Ottawa, telephone 888-663-3639, facsimile 613-996-9178 or e-mail [AD-CN@tc.gc.ca](mailto:AD-CN@tc.gc.ca) or any Transport Canada Centre.